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Abstract
We consider successive generations of non-altruistic individuals carrying a
good or bad gene. Daughters are more likely to carry their mother’s gene than
the opposite one. Competitive insurers can perform a genetic test revealing
an agent’s gene. They may condition their quotes on the agent’s or on her
ancestors’ genetic status. In equilibrium generation one is bribed to take
the test with an unconditional quote. The insurer uses this information
to profitably screen a finite number of generations of their offspring. The
offspring of good gene carriers subsidize the tested generation.
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1. Introduction
In recent years genetic tests have developed rapidly. These tests enable
the prediction of a higher than normal risk of developing specific diseases.
For insurers genetic tests constitute new possibilities for more precise risk
classification of their clients. These developments have, however, started a
debate on whether insurance companies should be allowed to use genetic
information to calculate premia according to the applicant’s genetic risk: to
many people it seems unfair charging individuals identified with a higher
than average risk of developing severe diseases substantially higher insurance
premia.
Despite this intensive political discussion the theoretical literature to the
specific case of genetic testing and health insurance has remained rather lim-
ited (Tabarrok (1994), Strohmenger and Wambach (2000), Andersson (2001),
Hoel and Iverson (2202), Hoy et al. (2203)). All of these papers consider
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) type static one-period insurance markets and
analyze the effects of genetic testing on the risk categorization of individuals
in the spirit of Hoy (1982).
It is, however, obvious that genetic information may also allow intertem-
poral discrimination. Information about the mothers’ genes may allow an
insurer to screen their offspring. If the mother carried the good gene, her
daughter is less likely to develop a disease than if her mother carried the bad
gene. Accordingly, it may be profitable for insurers to quote the offspring of
good gene carriers better rates than the offspring of bad gene carriers. The
purpose of this paper is to analyze the impact of genetic testing when such
intertemporal discrimination is possible.
We consider successive generations of individuals carrying a good or bad
gene. Daughters are more likely to inherit their mother’s gene than being
endowed with the opposite one. The fractions of the good and bad gene
carriers are constant through time.
Risk averse individuals must purchase full insurance. They are not altru-
istic, i.e., they do not care about the well-being of their offspring. At the
outset agents do not know which genes they carry. Insurers can, however,
perform a test which reveals an agent’s genes. Insurers quote prices for the
mandatory insurance which may be unconditional or may depend on the
agent’s or her ancestors’ test results. Insurers engage in price competition.
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Insurers cannot attract agents with non-loss making quotes conditional
on the agents’ genetic status. Competition ensures that a fair one-period
pooling quote is available under which the individual is fully insured. Prices
conditional on the genetic status expose the agent to risk to which she is,
however, averse. Accordingly, agents prefer the unconditional pooling con-
tract; see Tabarrok (1994).
Nevertheless, an insurer can exploit the fact that agents are not altruistic.
With a multi-period pricing strategy he can induce mothers to take the test
and then use this information to profitably screen their offspring.
Our equilibria have the following structure: An insurer bribes the first
generation to take the test with an unconditional quote which is below their
average probability to fall sick. The insurer then uses this information about
generation one to profitably screen their offspring. The offspring of the bad
gene carriers get their fair quotes. By contrast, the offspring of the good
gene carriers get unfair quotes and the insurer makes a profit on them. Price
competition ensures that these profits equal the subsidy given to the first
generation so that total profits sum up to zero. Moreover, due to competition
the price charged to the offspring of good gene carriers is constant through
time and equal to the price charged to generation one. Insurers use the
information about generation one to profitably screen a finite number of
generations of their offspring. When the last offspring generation has been
screened, the process starts all over again with testing the next generation.
Comparing these intertemporal screening equilibria to fair unconditional
pooling in each period, the tested generation is clearly better off: they pay a
price below their average probability of falling sick. The offspring of agents
carrying good genes pay a price above their probability of developing the
disease; they subsidize the tested generation. Nevertheless, they are still
better off than under unconditional pooling. The offspring of mothers with
the bad gene are worse off than under unconditional pooling: they pay the
price reflecting their higher than average risk of developing the disease. Since
the information about a mother’s bad gene becomes less precise as one moves
up the family tree, daughters of tested mothers pay a higher price than
granddaughters and so on.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the basic
model. In section three we introduce the genetic test. As a preliminary step
we first consider the scenario where information about the genes of mothers
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may only be used to screen daughters. Granddaughters have to be tested
anew. In the next subsection we allow the genetic information to be used for
any number of generations of the offspring. Section 4 concludes.
2. The Model
We consider successive generations of individuals Dt, t = 1, 2, . . .. Genera-
tions live for one period. Each member of generation t (mother) has exactly
one offspring (daughter) so that the size of all generations is the same. We
normalize the size of the generations to 1, i.e., f(Dt) = 1, t = 1, 2, . . ..
Each member of generation t, dt, can carry an `- or h-gene, i.e., dt ∈
{`, h}. If an individual is of type h, the probability of developing a disease is
h ∈ (0, 1); if she is of type `, the probability is ` ∈ (0, h), i.e., lower than for
the h-types. Denote the members of generation t with the `-gene by `t and
the ones with the h-gene by ht. Let the fraction of the h-types in generation
1 be f(h1) < 1/2 and the fraction of the `1’s accordingly f(`1) = 1− f(h1).
A daughter is more likely to be of type ` if her mother is of this type;
likewise, she is more likely to be of type h if her mother is so. A daughter
can, however, also carry the opposite gene as her mother. Formally, 1 >
f(`t+1|`t) > f(ht+1|`t) > 0 which implies f(`t+1|`t) > 1/2; 1 > f(ht+1|ht) >
f(`t+1|ht) > 0 so that f(ht+1|ht) > 1/2. Here f is the transition probability
of being of a certain type conditional on the type of the mother. These
transition probabilities are constant through time.
Let f(ht+1|`t) = f(`t+1|ht)f(ht)/f(`t), t = 1, 2, . . .. Then we have f(ht+1)
= f(ht) := f(h) and f(`t+1) = f(`t) := f(`), t = 1, 2, . . .; that is, the
fraction of `- and h-gene carriers are constant through time. Let, for example,
f(`) = 3/4, f(`t+1|`t) = 8/9, and f(ht+1|ht) = 2/3.
To sum up: We consider generations of size 1 in which the fractions of
`- and h-gene carriers are constant through time. The average probability
to develop the disease is the same in each generation and equals p̄(dt) =
f(h)h + f(`)` := p̄. Let h = 1/2 and ` = 1/4 so that in our example
p̄ = 5/16.
We normalize the cost of treating the disease to 1. Individuals are risk
averse which is represented by their utility function U(·) over income with
U ′ > 0 and U ′′ < 0.1 Individuals have initial income M > 1. To keep
1Our utility function is thus state independent. For an analysis with state contingent
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matters simple we assume that insurance is mandatory and equal to the size
of the treatment, i.e., individuals must purchase full insurance.2 Individuals
do not know which genes they carry. We further assume that agents are not
altruistic, i.e., mothers do not care about the well-being of their offspring.3
The mandatory insurance of 1 is provided by n ≥ 2 insurance companies
engaging in Bertrand competition. Insurer i, i = 1, . . . , n, quotes qit(·) for
the mandatory insurance in period t. The quotes may be unconditional or
they may depend on the result of a genetic test which we describe in the
next section. Insurers are risk neutral. They maximize the sum of expected
profits over time. For the ease of exposition we set the discount rate to zero.
Due to price competition equilibrium profits will be zero.
Without the genetic test neither the first generation’s insured know which
genes they carry nor do insurers, implying that any discrimination among
agents of generation 1 is impossible. From the second generation on insur-
ers could try to condition their quotes on the illness history of an agent’s
ancestors. To focus on the role of genetic tests, we rule out this possibil-
ity. Therefore, without the genetic test insurers can offer only unconditional
quotes in each period. Each insurer i will offer each period an unconditional
quote qit for the mandatory insurance of 1. Bertrand competition drives
profits down to zero so that in equilibrium qit = p̄, t = 1, 2, . . . , i = 1, . . . , n.
3. Genetic Test
Now assume a genetic test becomes available that reveals an individual’s
genes. We consider the case where only insurance companies can perform the
test.4 Let the test be costless. If an agent is tested, the insurer can condition
his quote on her genetic status. Moreover, the quotes for the individual’s
descendants can also depend on the agent’s test result.
utility functions see Strohmenger and Wambach (2000).
2Note that our mandatory insurance differs from the compulsory insurance in Hoel and
Iversen (2002). There all agents pay the same price but the insurance may be less than
complete. In our set-up insurance is full, yet prices may depend on individual risk.
3For our results to hold it is sufficient that mothers care less about their daughters’
well-being than their own.
4If the agents can take the test, the test results will also become known to the insurers.
If the test shows the `-gene, an agent will happily release this information to the insurer.
If the test result is h, the information will be kept secret. Accordingly, those individuals
who do not reveal their test are potentially high risk. See Tabarrok (1994).
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Suppose an insurer tries to attract individuals with prices qt(`t) < p̄ <
qt(ht) conditional on the test outcome. If the agent carries the `-gene, she gets
a better quote than if she carries the h-gene. Suppose further the prices do
not yield losses, i.e., f(h)qt(ht) + f(`)qt(`t) ≥ p̄. Then no agent will accept
this offer as long as pooling is available. With the fair pooling quote the
individual’s utility is U(M − p̄): the agent is fully insured and bears no risk
at all. With conditional prices the expected utility amounts to f(`)U(M −
qt(`t))+f(h)U(M−qt(ht)): the agent is fully insured but bears the price risk
generated by the genetic test. Jensen’s inequality together with the fact that
the conditional prices do not yield losses imply that the agents are better off
with the fair pooling quote p̄. Conditional pricing introduces risk to which
the agents are averse; see Tabarrok (1994).
Given that a one-period pricing strategy conditional on the test results
does not work out, an insurer can try to exploit the fact that agents are
not altruistic. With a multi-period pricing strategy he can try to induce
mothers to take the test and then use this information to profitably screen
their offspring.
To induce agents of generation t to take the test, the insurer must offer
them terms generating at least the expected utility of p̄. Since agents are risk
averse and insurers risk neutral, the best way to achieve this is by requiring
to take the test and then quoting qt ≤ p̄ which is not conditional on the test
outcome (we suppress the index for the insurer wherever possible). For the
agents’ daughters the insurer then quotes qt+1 = (qt+1(`t), qt+1(ht)), for their
granddaughters qt+2 = (qt+2(`t), qt+2(ht)), and so on.
3.1 Two-period Pricing Strategy
To fix ideas, suppose insurer 1 induces generation 1 to take the test and
then uses the genetic information about mothers to make a profit on their
daughters. The insurer may not use the information about mothers to screen
granddaughters. He has to start the process again with testing granddaugh-
ters. We consider at the moment only such two-period pricing strategies
together with with the one-period pricing strategy, i.e., unconditional pool-
ing. We will give up this assumption in the next section.
In equilibrium the market shares of insurers are undetermined. They may
share the market equally, or market shares may be asymmetric. To save on
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notation for market shares, in the following argument we look at the case
where insurer 1 serves the whole market as he may well do in equilibrium.
Suppressing the insurer index company one offers quotes q1 and q2 =
(q2(`1), q2(h1)). Here q2(`1) [q2(h1)] is the quote for daughters whose mothers
were of type ` [h]. With this two-period pricing strategy, his profits amount
to π1 = q1− p̄ and π2 = [q2(`1)−p(d2|`1)]f(`)+[q2(h1)−p(d2|h1)]f(h). There
are f(`) [f(h)] daughters whose mothers had the `- [h]-gene. The insurer’s
profits on the first group is the quote q2(`1) minus the expected probability
of developing the disease conditional on the mothers’ `-genes, and, likewise,
for the second group. In our example p(d2|`1) = 5/18 and p(d2|h1) = 5/12.
Let us first consider the quote q2(h1) the insurer charges daughters whose
mothers were of type h. This price is obviously restricted by what the com-
petition offers in period 2. This in turn depends on whether the competitors
can attract the entire generation or only those agents with type h-mothers.
Suppose the quote q2(`1) is such that the agents with type `-mothers
continue buying from firm 1. If q2(h1) > p(d2|h1), another firm can undercut
insurer 1 and make a positive profit on this group. Insurer 1 will not charge
q2(h1) < p(d2|h1) because this reduces his period two profit. Accordingly,
q2(h1) ≥ p(d2|h1). If the equality holds, the insurer serves this group while
making zero profits; if the inequality is strict, he loses this group and also
makes zero profits. We assume that he quotes q2(h1) = p(d2|h1) and serves
this group.
The insurer can, therefore, only make a profit on agents with type `-
mothers. This profit is, however, restricted. First note that q2(`1) ≤ p̄. If
this were not the case, another firm, say company 2, could enter the market
with an unconditional quote q22 ∈ (p̄, q2(`1)). He attracts the whole generation
2 and makes a profit because his quote is above the average probability of
falling sick.
Yet q2(`1) is further restricted by q1. To see this, suppose insurer 1 makes
zero profits with his two-period pricing strategy (q1,q2), i.e., π1 + π2 = 0.
Now let q2(`1) > q1. Then insurer 2 can enter the market with a two-period
pricing strategy (q22,q
2
3). With his price q
2
2 ∈ (q1, q2(`1)) he attracts both
groups who happily take the test. In period 3 he charges q23(`2) < q2(`1).
If q22, q
2
3(`2) are appropriately chosen, insurer 2 makes positive profits with
this two-period pricing strategy. Consequently, q2(`1) = q1 and Bertrand
competition ensures that (q1,q2) generate overall zero profits. Formally, π1 =
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q1 − p̄, π2 = [q1 − p(d2|`1)]f(l), and π1 + π2 = 0. Solving for q1 yields
q1 =
p̄ + f(`)p(d2|`1)
1 + f(`)
. (1)
To summarize our findings:
Proposition 1: Suppose firms are restricted to one- and two-period pricing
strategies. Then there exists an equilibrium where firm 1 charges generation
1 q11 as defined by (1) and generation 2 q
1
2(`1) = q
1
1, q
1
2(h1) = p(d2|h1). The
process starts all over again with generations 3, 5, . . .. Firm 1 serves the
entire market and the other firms are inactive.
In each odd period, say period 1, firm 1 induces all agents to take the
test at a quote q1 below the average probability to fall sick p̄. In our example
q1 = 75/252 < 5/16 = p̄ and π1 = −15/1008. In each even period the insurer
recoups his investment with the daughters whose mothers had the `-gene,
p(d2|`1) < q2(`1) = q1. In our example p(d2|`1) = 5/18 and π2 = 15/1008.
Let us use the example to show that in equilibrium indeed q2(`1) = q1.
Suppose on the contrary that insurer 1 charges, e.g., q1 = 291/1008 < 75/252
and q2 = 78/252. With these prices π1 +π2 = 0. Yet now insurer 2 can enter
with, say, q22 = 76/252 and q
2
3 = (75/252; 5/12). He attracts both groups in
period 2 and everybody takes the test. His profits in period 3 on daughters
of `-mothers outweigh his losses from period 2.
Note that this equilibrium is not unique. To save on notation for the
market shares, we look at the case where firm 1 serves the entire market and
the other firms are inactive. It is of course possible that, e.g., all firms quote
the equilibrium prices and share the market equally.
Let us compare this two-period pricing equilibrium with the one-period
one where firms charge p̄ in each period. The tested generations are clearly
better off because they pay a price below their average probability of falling
sick. By paying a price q1 above their probability of falling ill p(d2|`1), daugh-
ters of type `-mothers cross-subsidize the entire preceding generation. Yet
they are still better off than under one-period pooling. By contrast, daughters
of type h-mothers are worse off than in the one-period pooling equilibrium.
To summarize: In the two-period pricing equilibrium the tested generations
and their offspring with type `-mothers gain at the expense of their descen-
dants with type h-mothers.
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3.2. Arbitrary Pricing Strategies
We have seen that the two-period pricing strategy drives out the one-period
one. The next question to ask is whether insurer 1 should use his informa-
tional advantage about generation 1 also for generations 3, 4, . . .. To answer
this question we allow now for arbitrary pricing policies.5
As a first step we define k-period pricing policies starting from generation
1 on. Under such a policy generation 1 is tested and their genetic information
is then used on (k − 1) generations of their offspring. More specifically, we
define k-period pricing as follows:
For k = 2, 3, . . . the quotes q1,k, qt,k = (q1,k, p(dt|h1)), give rise to profits
π1 = p̄ − q1,k and πt = [q1,k − p(dt|`1)]f(`), t = 2, . . . , k. The zero profit
condition
∑k
t=1 πt = 0 then gives us
q1,k =
p̄ + f(`)
∑k
t=2 p(dt|`1)
1 + (k − 1)f(`)
. (2)
To complete the definition let q1,1 = p̄; with one-period pricing only uncon-
ditional pooling is possible.
We have defined k-period pricing rather narrowly. We have already taken
into account that k-period pricing must lead to zero profits. Moreover, we
have determined q1,k such that it is an equilibrium if only one-period and
k-period pricing are allowed for. A firm offering q1,k as defined by (2) cannot
be driven out of the market by the one-period pooling price q1,1 = p̄. We
have q1,k < p̄ because p(dk|`1) < p̄ for all k = 2, 3, . . ..
It is, however, unclear which k-period pricing policy firms will follow. If,
e.g., q1,3 > q1,4, a firm with the 3-period pricing policy will be driven out of
the market by a firm using the 4-period one. In a second step we analyze,
therefore, the prices q1,k, k = 1, 2 . . . in detail. It turns out that these prices
are U-shaped in k.
Proposition 2: The set of quotes {q1,k}, k = 1, 2, . . ., defined by (2) is
U-shaped in k and attains its minimum at some finite κ ≥ 2.
5We assume that, say, an agent of generation 3 does not know her mother’s quote.
Otherwise, she could use her mother’s low rate to convince another insurer that her grand-
mother must have been of type `.
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Proof: Straightforward computations show that q1,1 = p̄ > q1,2. Next note
that
q1,k < (≥) q1,k+1 ⇔
p̄− p(dk+1|`1) < (≥) f(`)[(k − 1)p(dk+1|`1)−
k∑
t=2
p(dt|`1)], k = 2, 3, . . . .
The LHS is positive and monotonically decreasing in k with limk→∞ LHS = 0.
The RHS is positive and increasing in k. Consequently, either κ = 2 or it is
defined by the k where the strict inequality first holds. q1,k is decreasing in
k for k < κ and increasing for k > κ.
Q.E.D.
Proposition 2 states that a κ-period pricing strategy leads to the lowest
price q1,k that can be charged to the tested generation 1 and all (k − 1)
descendant generations of the `1-types. In our example κ = 3. We have
p̄ = 5/16, p(d2|`1) = 5/18, p(d3|`1) = 95/324, p(d4|`1) = 220/729, q1,1 =
5/16, q1,2 = 75/252, q1,3 = 8/27, and q1,4 = 2820/9427 > q1,3.
Increasing the pricing strategy from k to k+1 increases profits by πk+1 =
(q1,k+1− p(dk+1|`1))f(`). If πk+1 > 0, the profits made on the descendants of
types `1 increases. Hence, q1,k+1 < q1,k. The tested generation gets a larger
cross-subsidy so that total profits sum up to zero.
Conversely, if πk+1 < 0, q1,k+1 > q1,k. The profits made on the offspring of
types `1 decreases and so does the subsidy for the tested generation. Straight-
forward computations show that πk+1 < 0 is equivalent to q1,k < p(dk+1|`1).
If the price q1,k charged under k-period pricing is lower than the conditional
probability of falling ill of generation k+1, adding this cohort lowers the prof-
its made on the descendants of types `1’s. The existence of such a critical
cohort is ensured because p(dk+1|`1) converges to p̄ as k becomes large.
To put it differently: The informational advantage of having tested gen-
eration 1 dilutes with successive generations: p(dk+1|`1) increases with k
and converges to p̄. Adding additional generations to the pricing strategy
becomes less and less attractive as one moves up the family tree.
As long as it is profitable to add a generation to the pricing policy, the
price q1 falls. If the additional generation adds to profits made on the off-
spring of the tested generation 1, the price q1 has to fall so that overall profits
sum up to zero. Yet, there is some generation (κ+1) where p(dκ+1|`1) exceeds
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the price q1,κ charged under the κ-period pricing policy. Adding this gener-
ation to the pricing policy lowers profits made on the offspring and actually
increases q1. This reasoning is similar to the well-known textbook result that
average costs are decreasing as long as they are higher than marginal costs
and increasing when the are smaller than marginal costs.
It is now clear how an equilibrium looks like:
Proposition 3: There exists an equilibrium where firm 1 follows a κ-period
pricing policy with κ defined by Proposition 2. It charges the first generation
q11,κ as defined by (2) and its offsprings q
1
t,κ(`1) = q
1
1,κ, q
1
t,κ(h1) = p(dt|h1), t =
2, . . . , κ. The procedure starts all over again with generations κ+1, 2κ+1, . . ..
Firm 1 serves the entire market and the other firms are inactive.
If firm 1 charges q1,κ, it can not be driven out of the market by another
pricing policy because they all command higher prices. Let us compare the
κ-period pricing equilibrium to the one-period pooling equilibrium q1,1 = p̄.
The advantage of the tested generation 1 and the descendants of the types
`1 is greatest because q1,κ is minimal. Bertrand competition ensures that the
surplus of these groups is maximized.
What about the offspring of the types h1? They are worse off than under
under pooling because p(dt|h1) > p̄, t = 2, 3, . . .. Note that p(dt|h1) is de-
creasing in t. Generation (t+1) gets a lower quote than generation t because
the information about them from their ancestor is less precise. Accordingly,
daughters of tested h-mothers suffer more than granddaughters and so on if
genetic tests become available.
4. Conclusions
The purpose of this paper is to analyze intertemporal screening through
genetic tests. We show that generation one is bribed to take the test with
an unconditional quote. The insurer then uses this information to profitably
screen a finite number of generations of their offspring. The offspring of
good gene carriers subsidize the tested generation. Yet they are still better
off than under unconditional pooling. The offspring of bad gene carriers lose
compared to pooling because they have to pay a price reflecting their higher
than average risk of developing the disease.
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In this paper we abstract from many important aspects of genetic tests in
health insurance markets. We assume that only the insurer can take the test
and that the test results are not observable by any other party. The testing
insurance company thus has a monopoly for the information. Agents cannot
take the test themselves so that we do not run into the problems of strategic
revelation of the results. Moreover, the assumption of compulsory complete
insurance rules out further screening possibilities of the insurers.
The assumption that agents are non-altruistic is, by contrast, not critical;
all we need is that they care more about their own than the well-being of their
offspring. The cost of the test may also be positive. As long as the test cost
is below the profits made on the screened generations, our results still hold
qualitatively. Only when the test cost is above these profits, intertemporal
screening does not pay.
We hope that despite these simplifying assumptions we shed some light on
how intertemporal screening with genetic tests might work. In particular, we
are able to identify the winners and the losers compared to the unconditional
pooling situation. This might be helpful in the ongoing political discussion
about the pro and cons of allowing genetic tests for health insurance.
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